ELEUTHERIA

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Message from the President

Francis Peddle

I

In October I attended the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the Council of Georgist Organizations in Fairhope, Alabama. Situated on the idyllic eastern shore of Mobile Bay, Fairhope celebrated its centenary this year. The founders of the "colony," as it is still referred to by many residents, were primarily Iowan followers of the nineteenth century philosopher and economist Henry George such as E.B. Gaston and W.H. Greeno. By making land freely available to the early settlers, the original colonists believed that social justice could be historically achieved and that such an experiment had a "fair hope" of success.

The basic principle of the Fairhope utopians is still with us in a number of different guises. All people have an equal entitlement to the bounty of nature and that such opportunity cannot be circumscribed by any one person without repaying the community for such a privilege. Any monopolization of the gifts of nature must be commensurate with a reimbursement to others for being denied their proportionate share in what nature has to offer. Conversely, all people have a right to the fruits of their labour and efforts, the denial of which is a fundamental infringement of their right to property in themselves. The denial of property in ourselves and the freedom necessarily aligned with such a concept, be it through the state's appropriation of labour income, social therapy and the ethics of society or the profusion of laws which negate both the ethics of self-perfecting and the ethics of the altruism, is one of the most singularly acute problems facing the philosophical reformation of our culture.

The Fairhope utopians sought to implement these principles through the vehicle of the Fairhope Single Tax Corporation, which leased lands in the community to settlers. This corporation is still in existence, although lands held in trust for the community are now limited and surrounded by fee simple lands in the fast-growing greater Fairhope area. Interestingly, the Fairhope pier and neighbouring beach and parkland are the only shoreline in Mobile Bay which is accessible to everyone and not owned and restricted by private interests. The colonists believed that all should be able to enjoy and revel in the sublime natural beauty of this estuary on the northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico.

During the conference in Fairhope I had the opportunity to introduce a new book of mine entitled *CITIES AND GREED: Taxes, Inflation and Land Speculation*, which is published by the Canadian Research Committee on Taxation. I have been the Director of Research for the Committee for the past eight years. This study examines the interlocking problems which pervade our urban economies and systems of local government finance. It proposes solutions that are based on a number of the philosophical concepts espoused by the Fairhope utopians, Henry George, the physiocrats and classical economists such as Smith and Ricardo. The book is available through the Institute for $19.95

(Cdn.) or $14.95 (U.S.) plus $3.60 shipping and handling.

The current issue of ***ELEUTHERIA*** contains pieces by Peter McCormick and myself. McCormick's piece is a revised version of an invited paper presented at the XIVth International Taniguchi Symposium in Philosophy, held in Kyoto, Japan, September 8-13, 1994. The essay on Schweitzer and Bach was originally given by me at the annual meeting of the Canadian Society for Aesthetics at McMaster University in May, 1987. I have made only marginal alterations in syntax since that conference.

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The Institute now has available for purchase at $5.00 per copy Volume One in its ***MONOGRAPH SERIES***. The monograph, entitled, ***Speculative Philosophy and Practical Life***, is by James Lowry, andoriginally appeared in the *Fall, 1990* issue of ***ELEUTHERIA***. Each volume in the ***MONOGRAPH SERIES*** contains a ***Concordance*** and ***Line Numbering*** for easy reference.

APPREHENDING THE TRUTH ABOUT SUFFERING

Peter McCormick

I would like to consider here some recent reflections in modern Japanese philosophical reflection on eco-ethics and to examine the putative truth of their central claims. After highlighting several of these eco-ethical claims, I will review briefly just how such claims may be said to be true on the basis of a mixed coherence theory of the nature of truth. Turning to several related but importantly different eco-ethical claims, I will then try to show just why accounting for their putative truth requires a different kind of theory altogether. As a candidate for the requisite alternative I will go on to nominate a recent version of Imamichi Tomonobu's eco-ethical account of truth.

In section three I will then examine a third type of eco-ethical claim, a fundamental claim about suffering and the deep pathos of things. My point will be that neither the mixed coherence account nor the comparative account of truth can satisfactorily appraise the putative truth of such claims about suffering. In concluding, I will turn for inspiration to some late reflections of Kant in the *Opus postumum* on one kind of thought-contents he calls "fictions." And I will end by suggesting several questions for further eco-ethical reflection, while pointing to importantly related issues in modern Japanese philosophical reflection, questions that arise in trying to rationally appraise such puzzling claims about suffering with the help of some constructivist understanding of the nature of truth that awards a central role to these Kantian fictions.

1. REPRESENTATIVE ECO-ETHICAL CLAIMS

Consider several recent claims in Imamichi Tomonobu's 1993 Taniguchi Symposium paper, "Eco-Ethica in the Perspective of Urbanica."[1] After discussing the need for intercultural comparative study of metaphysical topics such as space and time, Imamichi Tomonobu proceeds to distinguish between two types of temporality (pp. 13-15). We find the first wherever we have a technological context, the second in aesthetic contexts.

When we try to describe this difference phenomenologically, we may note that in technological processes time appears, as it were, to be oriented horizontally. By contrast, in experiences of aesthetic appreciation time appears to "spiral up vertically from the sensible encounter to the shining of beauty in the direction of eternity" (p. 14). We do well therefore to avoid any reductive construals of the temporality of consciousness in terms of the "horizontal temporality" of technological processes only, and instead to understand the temporality of consciousness in terms of the "ascensional temporality" of aesthetic appreciation.

I would like to bring into focus at least one of the essential points in this suggestive reflection. And I will try, however provisionally, to formulate that point as an important recent result of the eco-ethical research program. Let us say then that, of the many interesting claims comprising this reflection, at least one central eco-ethical claim here might initially be put as follows:

EE 1

> Reflection on the necessity of a peculiar kind of temporal duration for the appreciation of at least some works of art shows that the temporality of human consciousness must be understood in other terms than those of linear physical duration only.

More simply, we can rewrite this as a negative claim:

*EE 1**

> The temporality of human consciousness is not identical with the temporality of linear physical duration.

This formulation of course captures only part of Imamichi Tomonobu's recent eco-ethical reflections on temporality, consciousness, and technology, and then only imperfectly. Nonetheless, the formulation has a certain initial plausibility. For, whatever the possible obscurity in some of its details - for example, the notion of an "ascensional temporality" - the claim seems right.

Suppose that indeed the claim is true. We then want to know just what it means to say that such a claim is true. That is, we want to know what kind of a theory of truth could account for the putative truth of important recent eco-ethical claims like this one.

Now, even in our own thoroughly skeptical times, truth theories abound. And, depending on our interests and our choices of cognitive frameworks, each has its particular strengths and weaknesses. But we need not attempt any wearisome inventory of such work here. Instead, we do better to recall the main elements of just one kind of theory, a mixed coherence theory of truth that I detailed critically five years ago at the Taniguchi Symposium in Kyuze-So on Lake Biwa. (My example was Hilary Putnam's work on pragmatic realism).[2] Such a theory, I believe, can account quite nicely for the putative truth of any number of claims, including representative eco-ethical claims about temporality.

This kind of mixed coherence theory is a theory of the nature of truth. It is not a theory of a criterion for truth or of the justification of truth. Characteristically, the theory mixes coherence with correspondence. Here "correspondence" refers, roughly, to the idea that truth consists in some specifiable relation between the contents of propositions and some situation that obtains independently of any beliefs we may entertain about it. And "coherence" refers, again roughly, to the idea that some specifiable relationship holds between an individual belief and a system of beliefs. (We need the qualification, "roughly," because these descriptions are informal and because correspondence and coherence theories may be theories not just of truth, as here, but of

belief or of justification or, more generally, of knowledge.)

When orchestrated for the rational appraisal of representative eco-ethical claims like the claim about the temporality of consciousness above, a mixed coherence theory of truth comprises more than one major element. First, such a theory includes the idea that some correspondences do hold between beliefs and apparent facts and values. The theory also includes the idea that the propositional contents of these correspondences cohere with the propositional contents of some critical version of present standards of rational acceptability. Further, the theory construes the apparent facts and values to which certain beliefs are said to correspond as objective, non-arbitrary realities, and yet as not completely independent of everything that may be believed about them. Fourth, the theory takes such objective yet not completely independent realities as human constructs. Finally, these constructs arise historically within different cultures from the play of different interests and practices that determine the choice of cognitive roles, critical terms, and conceptual frameworks.

With this kind of mixed theory of the nature of truth in place, the putative truth of representative eco-ethical claims can be said to consist in the contents of the relevant propositions standing in a relation of coherence with some larger system of beliefs. Moreover, this larger system of beliefs is not identical with that of any one eco-ethical theorist and therefore is intrinsically corrigible in the light of further eco-ethical reflection. Further, the larger belief system is organized in terms of mind-dependent and not world-dependent classifications. These classifications include, among other elements, logical laws and principles of inference that follow not from any intuitive direct awareness but from beliefs properly supported by other beliefs.

Finally, the putative truth of eco-ethical claims like the one above is both immanent and transcendent.[3] Such truth is immanent because it is embodied in the historically contingent and correlative relations among a particular culture's practices and standards. But such truth is also transcendent because the putative truth of such claims, while embodying implicit norms within a particular culture, interprets these implicit norms with a broad non-criterial rather than with a narrow criterial conception of rationality. And this non-criterial conception is what allows of consistency in dealing with intercultural cognitive practices.

2. Self-Referential Eco-Ethical Claims

Consider now how we are to account for the putative truth of a different type of eco-ethical claim, one kind only of a positive claim about the nature of truth itself in a comparative context. In a 1990 paper Imamichi Tomonobu raises questions about the compatibility of radically contrasting views about the nature of truth.[4] One contrast is between European identifications of truth with exactness and East Asian identifications of truth with “sincerity.” A second contrast is between the central importance for Western European traditions of articulating factual descriptions, and the central importance for East Asian traditions of providing a decisive judgment about the possibility of human freedom. Fundamental, however, to each of these two contrasts is a third, a contrast between what Imamichi Tomonobu calls “la verité du donne et la verité du donnant” (p. 76), between the truth of what is given and the truth of, say, the “giving.” Appreciating these contrasts requires an intercultural understanding of truth. And this understanding is to be sought, in Imamichi Tomonobu's words, “afin de s'approcher de la complétude de la verité du donne et de la verité du donnant” (p. 76).

Suppose we try again to formulate just one central element in this manifold eco-ethical reflection about the nature of truth.

EE 2

> The nature of truth is properly understood neither as the exactness of a factual description of the world of what is given, nor as the "sincerity" of the "giving" or rendering of a judgment about the possibility of human freedom to provide such a description,but as an approximation to the completeness of the truth of the given and the truth of the "giving."

To simplify, perhaps we may rewrite this as:

*EE 2**

> Truth is an approximation to the completeness of the truth of the given and that of the "giving."

We may set aside exactly what Imamichi Tomonobu means when he writes, in Japanese, about "approximation," "the given," and "the giving." We may take these terms to mean something very much like what they mean in philosophical discussion today in English. We may also set aside any consideration here of persistent puzzles about meaning, reference, denotation, signification, and so on. We shall, in short, assume that we have a good, even if vague, idea of what this claim means. And the claim seems plausible.

We then come back to our guiding question - what might allow us to account for the putative truth of just this kind of eco-ethical claim? The first response is that the mixed coherence view we used to account for the putative truth of the first kind of eco-ethical claim will not do. Why not?

The mixed coherence theory has its virtues. It incorporates both an account of what a theory specifically of the nature of truth is expected to do and an account of what the nature of truth is. Moreover, the theory recognizes the tension between the objectivity of certain situations and yet the plausibility of their mind-dependence. Finally, the theory is also sensitive to a dialectic between immanence and transcendence in the interpretation of non-criterial forms of rationality. But the theory cannot accommodate eco-ethical claims like EE 2* because it lacks sufficient resources for dealing effectively with several problems about consistency.

The main problems of consistency here are two. First, the mixed coherence version of truth is not self-referentially consistent. For the claim that the mixed coherence version is itself true cannot be sustained by appeal to the theory itself. The elements of the theory are not powerful enough to account for its own supposed truth. And, second, this theory cannot avoid question-begging. For no legitimate appeal can be made to a self-referentially inconsistent version of truth to account for the putative truth of a self-referential claim like EE 2*. Even an informal theory must satisfy some interpretation of consistency. So a mixed coherence theory will not do.

Two options remain for appraising with eco-ethical claims like EE 2* - either we try to fix the old theory, or we try to find a new one. In other words, we can either modify the mixed coherence theory by building into some more powerful version of the theory features about consistency that would make the amended theory self-referentially consistent and non-question begging. Or we can look round for some version of the nature of truth that can deal effectively with self-referential claims.

After reflection, I suggest we decline the invitation to modify still further our already arguably over-extended version of the mixed coherence version of the nature of truth. And I suggest, second, that we explore the resources of Imamichi Tomonobu's own version of the nature of truth.

The eco-ethical theory of truth, as I described it lengthily three years ago, has I believe four major components.[5] First, the theory incorporates a contrast between a theoretical under-

standing of truth as the unification of the essential characteristics of something in propositional form, say the truth of linguistic representation, and a practical understanding of truth as the completion of a situation through active engagement with the situation, say the truth of expressive action. Second, the theory includes a crucial distinction between two perspectives on truth, truth as something to be articulated preeminently from a reflective perspective and truth as something to be affirmed preeminently from a perspective on action. The first perspective is in the service of description, the second is in the interests of judgment.

A third element in the eco-ethical theory is a critique of the descriptive goals and theoretical perspectives that partially comprise the understanding of truth as linguistic representation. These goals are held to narrow the scope of truth unduly. The consequence is a divorce between the ratiocinative aspects of truth from their fulfillment in deliberation, judgment, and practical action. Finally, the eco-ethical theory claims that what is properly true of a situation requires a unification, not of the logoi or reasons in a linguistic representation, but of the subject with the object in the appropriate fullness of the situation.

Now, unlike the mixed coherence version of truth, I think this eco-ethical version enables us to account for the putative truth of such self-referential claims as EE 2*. For it successfully resists succumbing to the very serious difficulties that disabled the mixed coherence version, while effectively side-stepping rather than endlessly tinkering with problems of self-reference.

Worries about self-referential inconsistency are now groundless, since the eco-ethical version of truth can be consistently applied to itself. Thus, when rationally appraised from its own standpoint, the central claims of the theory exhibit just those features to which they themselves appeal when the theory is used for the rational appraisal of the putative truth of other claims. Moreover, instead of trying to incorporate an indefinite number of ever more refined features to solve the proliferating problems of self-reference, the eco-ethical theory sidesteps such problems altogether by shifting critical attention from semantic concerns to pragmatic ones. So, where the mixed coherence theory fails, the eco-ethical theory succeeds.

3. Eco-Ethical Claims and Suffering

Consider now how we are to account for the putative truth of still another recent eco-ethical claim, this time a claim about evil and suffering.[6] After detailing a comparative and critical study of Confucius's disciple Mencius and Kant's mentor Leibniz on natural, moral, and metaphysical evil, Imamichi Tomonobu writes in summary: "We need to say that several good things can be changed into one or more major evils. Evil can be the culmination of things that are good. Evil can be the telos, the end, and the termination of the historical development of all good things. The evil of evils now rules the world" (p. 127).

Perhaps we may highlight the last sentence:

EE 3

"The evil of evils now rules the world."

But what is this "evil of evils?" Earlier on in the same passage Imamichi Tomonobu writes: "the most serious *kakon* is the holocaust brought about by nationalistic, militaristic, and religious fanatics" (p. 127). We can take "the most serious *kakon*" as synonymous with "the evil of evils."[7] As for "holocaust," unlike most historians, however, Imamichi Tomonobu uses this word to refer not only to the Nazi attempted genocide of European Jewry but also to "the holocaust caused by the Japanese military" (p. 127). And the connection between evil and suffering? "Suffering" here is to be taken in Mencius's sense of "psychic suffering," more explicitly as "psychic pathos," as "internal pain" (pp. 126-7).[8] Thus, the expression "the evil of

evils" connotes not just the most evil instance of all metaphysical, natural, and moral evils, but also the notion of evil as "psychic suffering."

In the light of Imamichi Tomonobu's extensive reflections elsewhere,[9] we have a good idea of what this claim means. Pernicious assumptions about the supposed axiological neutrality of technology and the global technological conjuncture hold sway everywhere today. What is most evil about the contemporary global situation then is not just the metaphysical, natural, and moral evils that often result from such extraordinarily powerful assumptions going effectively unchallenged, but the "psychic suffering" these manifold evils cause almost everyone. How so?

May we say they do so by maintaining persons everywhere in their dogmatic slumbers, or, to add an East Asian figure, by keeping persons sleeping in their burning houses? When such pervasive, powerful, and extremely hazardous assumptions are unchallenged, human beings may be said to be asleep. This sleep has nothing to do with psychological suffering. Rather, because it most concerns the spirit, this sleep has everything to do with "psychic suffering." How to find a way to awake, to be shaken free from one's dogmatic slumbers and to flee the burning house, is, I suspect, one of the major lines of force in Imamichi Tomonobu's eco-ethics.

Perhaps we may then rewrite Imamichi Tomonobu's claim as:

*EE 3**

The evil of evils that rules the world is suffering.

But how could we ever account for the putative truth of such a mysterious saying? After reflection, I do not think that a mixed coherence version of the nature of truth will work here either. The reason now, however, does not involve problems with different kinds of consistency issues. For this claim itself is not a self-referential sentence positively asserting something putatively true about the truth or falsity of some other sentence about the world. Moreover, rationally appraising this kind of claim does not require obviating doubts about question-begging. Rather, the reason for the failure here follows from a problem with the coherence relation.

Recall that, according to the mixed coherence version, the correspondences between beliefs and facts are supposed to be integrated into a larger coherence between the propositional contents of these correspondences and some idealized critical account of present standards of rational acceptability. But how could the propositional contents of our beliefs about "psychic suffering" be properly said to cohere with critical yet idealized standards of rational acceptability? For an essential part of the very suffering at issue here follows directly from the generalization of current successful instances of non-idealized standards of rational acceptability.

The repeated applications of those current standards are what continue to fuel the expansion of the global technological conjuncture. And the unchallenged assumptions that govern this conjuncture are what give rise to much of the suffering Imamichi Tomonobu claims is the evil of evils. In short, the very rational acceptability that is at the heart of the mixed coherence theory is itself part of the problem it is being adduced to solve. So any appeal to a mixed coherence version of the nature of truth in view of appraising the putative truth of an eco-ethical claim like EE 3* ought to be denied.

An appeal to an eco-ethical version of truth ought to be denied also. This theory, we recall, emphasizes truth not as a linguistic articulation arising from subjective and theoretical reflection, but truth as the completion of deliberation and judgment through expression in practical action.

When I reflect from an eco-ethical perspective on whether some particular claim is true, for example, on whether it is true that unless I jump into the Sumidagawa river now little Taro will surely drown, I can understand that the truth of such a claim may be taken as having something essential to do with more than the exactness and correctness of my theoretical descriptive representation of the situation. For this particular situation directly solicits my practical engagement in ways that many other situations do not.

But my present apprehension of the situation is incomplete in that I can know only in the future whether the claim at issue is true or false. In this sense the truth or falsity of my claim depends essentially on the situation achieving a fullness, a completion either through my subsequent action or inaction. Only then, in the future, can I determine whether my present claim about the future, "unless I jump into the Sumidagawa now little Taro will surely drown," is true.

When, however, I reflect from the same perspective on whether the claim "the evil of evils now governing the world is suffering" is true, I am not able to determine philosophically just what would ever count as bringing to perfection or completion such a mysterious situation in an appropriate action. For it is not clear either that the situation is imperfect or incomplete in just the sense in which the previous situation surely is, or, regardless of its perfection or completion, just what the situation actually is. (Perhaps this fact is the "mystery" of the situation?)

And the reason for the essential disparity between the two cases is evident. For properly appraising the second claim has to do with what we might call the timelessness of a tenseless situation, whereas properly appraising the first has to do with a tensed situation, a situation in some future time however near.

We already saw that the unsatisfactory status of the coherence relation disqualifies a mixed coherence version of truth from taking the critical measure of eco-ethical claims about suffering. We now can see that the conjunction of the tenseless character of such fundamental and important claims about suffering with the distinctions between completed and uncompleted situations, perfected and imperfect situations, disqualifies the eco-ethical version of truth as well.

4. Fictional Truths?

I am not able to provide a fully articulated and well-defended alternative account of the nature of truth. May I offer you then, *faute de mieux,* a sketch only of several considerations, among others, such an alternative account should address in order to deal with the so far apparently intractable problems of appraising eco-ethical claims, and so many others, about suffering? My implicit suggestion will be that the putative truth of such claims may allow of rational appraisal when, after the example of some late reflections of Kant, we hold that some situations are properly construed as both objective non-arbitrary realities while remaining nonetheless human constructs. Such curious things however are not to be taken, as in the mixed coherence version, as "ideas." Nor are to be taken, as in the eco-ethical version. as "approximations to the truth." They are rather "Kantian fictions," or what I will call "fictions" *tout court.*

Kant deploys his late reflections on ideas and fictions in the *Opus postumum*.[10] In one key passage there Kant contrasts the two. "Ideas," he writes in summary, "are self-created subjective principles of the power of thought: not fictions [*Fiktionen*] but thought" (AA 21: 29). And he adds immediately, presumably as examples of both an idea and a fiction: "God is not the world soul" (*ibid.*). What then for Kant in his late work are "fictions?"

The existence of some things, Kant thinks, can be directly proved from experience, other things directly proved a priori. The existence of still other things, however, cannot be

directly proved a priori, whether by an analytic principle of judgment or by a synthetic one. Nonetheless, Kant believes one can indirectly prove the existence of at least one thing a priori. Although "not given objectively," Kant thinks God can be thought in the domain of human practical reason and the categorical imperative both subjectively and necessarily at the same time. Human duties, for example, can be thought of "as divine commands" (22: 121-122).

The key point here for the understanding of fictions is Kant's remark that, were one to assume that the existence of something could be directly proved a priori "as a hypothetical thing for the sake of possible appearances," one would not be demonstrating at all - one would be doing what Kant calls "feigning" (*dichten*" - 22: 121). Kant uses the same term a bit later (22: 124) when he talks of the idea of an omnipotent, "moral and holy, unconditionally commanding will," and the idea "of a substance which is unique in its concept, and is not subordinated to a classification of human reason." Such a being, Kant says here, is "thought (or, rather feigned) as a natural being . . . ." What then are we to understand by "feigning?"

In the light of Kant's extensive reflections on the nature and kinds of a creative reason and its peculiar objects in the *Opus postumum* (which I cannot summarize here), we may understand feigning as the act of producing, through different processes of technical-practical (not moral-practical) reason, those peculiar thought-objects Kant opposes to ideas. Feigning is reason's creative production of fictions. Such production occurs specifically in the articulation of as-if postulations.

Kant talks of as-if postulation in various parts of the *Opus postumum.* For example, at the beginning of a long set of reflections on practical self-positing and the ideas of God he writes: "the existence of such a being [God], however, can only be postulated in a practical respect: namely, the necessity of acting in such a way as if I stood under such a fearsome - but yet, at the same time, salutary - guidance and also guarantee, in the knowledge of all my duties as divine commands (*tanquam non ceu*); hence the existence of such a being is not postulated in this formula, which would be self-contradictory" (22: 116). For Kant, God is not a fiction.

The point of this citation is Kant's proposal that we construe the duties persons are required to fulfil as if they were divine commands (22: 120). But, in order to preserve human freedom, the "as" Kant takes relatively rather than absolutely. He writes, we observed, "tanquam ["relatively as"] non ceu" ["absolutely as"] (cf. 21: 28 note). Thus, for Kant all the duties of the person are what he elsewhere calls "as if divine commands" (21: 17). And he spells out just what this description comes to. "These commands are divine (*praecepta inviolabilia*)," he writes, "that is, [they] permit no mitigation, and the judgment of condemnation is pronounced upon this transgression through man's own reason, just as if addressed by a moral power which executes the judgment" (21: 20).

As-if postulations then are hypothetical. Their bases are analogies. These analogies are to be understood in relative not absolute terms. More specifically, the relative analogies that underpin as-if postulations are a matter of degree, "virtualities" Kant says (21: 11).

So making an as-if postulation comes to making a virtual assertion. Something is or is not the case relatively speaking, in a manner of speaking, in a manner of saying, to a matter of degree. Consequently, the postulating of such virtual assertions may be taken as "feignings," and what is postulated may be taken as "fictions." More exactly, "fictions" in this late Kantian context are some distinctive "thought-objects" that are neither purely subjective nor objective but virtual objects, objects relatively speaking.

An example of a fiction in this sense is the

notion of "the real" - "the real," Kant writes,"which cannot be a sense-object, and the real which must necessarily be such, if it is to be a given object - as space and time are each only one (22: 59). And we can see more clearly the problematic link here between fictions and necessity when we recall one of the last descriptions Kant gives of the nature of some ideas within the scope of a transcendental philosophy. "Transcendental philosophy," Kant writes, "is the absolute whole (system) of ideas; thus it is immediately directed towards objects (*ens summum, summa intelligentia,* etc.) which, independently of experience, are postulated by pure reason as objects (for the sake of) its (experience's) possibility" (21: 80).

CONCLUSION

May I end these brief reflection on eco-ethics and trying to apprehend the truth of suffering with several questions? How are we to rationally appraise the putative truths of eco-ethical claims about suffering, i.e. just those claims that include a critique of our understandings of rational appraisal itself in today's global technological conjuncture, without postulating as thought objects of these claims "fictional" situations?[11] And were we to appropriate some suitably critical form of Kantian fictions for our continuing philosophical tasks of rational appraisal, would we then be constrained to hold that the truth of suffering is, paradoxically, a fictional truth?[12] And would we only then, in the apprehension of so powerful a paradox, have sufficient warrant to rightly conclude, with Imamichi Tomonobu and with so many others, that, truly, the evil of evils is suffering?

NOTES

1. See *Revue internationale de philosophie moderne,* 11 (Tokyo, 1994). Here I cite a manuscript copy.

2. "Eco-Ethical Truths: Coherence, Pragmatic Realism, and Fictionality," *Revue internationale de philosophie moderne,* 8 (Tokyo, 1990), 155-185, esp. pp. 177-181.

3. For a different but here quite pertinent understanding of immanence and transcendence, see Abe Nobuhiko, *Semiotics of Self in Theology: A Comparative Study of James and Nishida*, PhD Dissertation, Harvard Divinity School, 1992, pp. 161-167.

4. "Contrariétés et Compatibilités," *Entretiens sur Philosophie et Histoire: Actes du Congres* (Geneva, 1990), pp. 55-77.

5. "Eco-Ethics, Relativism, and Truth," *Revue internationale de philosophie moderne*, 11 (Tokyo, 1993), 155-177, esp. pp. 172-175.

6. Imamichi Tomonobu, "The Urgent Task of Theodicy in our Present Time," *Festschrift for Margaret Chatterjee* (New Delhi, 1992).

7. Note that the expression, "the evil of evils," is ambiguous, referring either to the superlative, "what is most evil," or to what it is that makes evil the thing it is. The Belgian philosopher of science, Jean Ladriere, has brought out and examined this ambiguity in subsequent discussion.

8. Mencius's understanding, in different ways than that of Confucius, is complex. Its interpretation even today remains controversial. So, the notion here of "psychic suffering" as a rendering of Mencius' idea needs further reflection. I owe this point, and others, to the distinguished historian of East Asia, Koh Byong-ik.

9. See especially his numerous papers, in German, French, and English, in the volumes of the *Revue internationale de philosophie moderne*. Back issues can be had by writing to: Centre International pour Étude comparée de Philosophie et d'Esthetique, Shiozaki Building, 2-7-1, Hirakawa-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102, Japan.

10. The still controversial text of Kant's *Opus postumum* can be found in Volumes 21 and 22

of *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Koeniglichen Preussischen (later Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1900 -), customarily abbreviated as AA or the Akademie Ausgabe. An English translation of a selection from these volumes has recently appeared (1993) by E. Foerster and M. Rosen in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. I cite this translation here.

11. Cf. the remarks of Nishitani Keiji on the distinctions between philosophy and thinking in, among other writings, "Encounter with Nothingness," in *The Religious Philosophy of Nishitani Keiji*, ed. Unno Taitetsu (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1989), pp. 2-3. A number of the interpretive essays in this valuable collection, notably those of Abe Masao, Gordon Kaufman, Langdon Gilkey, and Thomas J. J. Altizer, provide helpful commentary.

12. For related reflections see, as one example among many, John Maraldo, "Metanoetics and the Crisis of Reason: Tanabe, Nishida, and Contemporary Philosophy," in *The Religious Philosophy of Tanabe Hajime*, ed. Unno Taitetsu and J. W. Heisig (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1990), pp. 235-255.

ALBERT SCHWEITZER'S PRINCIPLES OF AESTHETIC INTERPRETATION

Francis K. Peddle

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Albert Schweitzer's principles of aesthetic interpretation evolved out of his study of the music of Johann Sebastien Bach. In his own time Bach was recognized primarily as a virtuoso keyboard player and not the consummate composer-artist of the Baroque period. Manfred Bukofzer sums up the art of Bach as a higher unity of diverse national styles:

> The fate of late baroque music hung in the balance between the Italian and the French style, recognized by theorists and composers alike as the two poles of late baroque music. The harmonic resources of tonality, the concerto style in instrumental and vocal music, and the concerto and sonata forms of "absolute" music passed as the characteristics of the Italian style; the coloristic and programmatic trends in instrumental music, the orchestral discipline, overture and dance suite, and the highly florid ornamentation of the melody passed as the characteristics of the French style. The German style, universally recognized as the third in the group of national styles, was characterized by its marked proclivity for a solid harmonic and contrapuntal texture. Serving as the mediator between the two poles it brought the reconciliation of the opposed Italian and French techniques in a higher unity. The music that finally culminated in Bach attained its universality and distinction through the deliberate fusion of national styles.[1]

Through much of what we now call the classical period in music, Bach remained relatively obscure and unstudied. The interpretation of his

music was uncontroversial. Counterpoint was an art-form of the past, either supplanted by the sonata-allegro form *per se* or subsumed within the development of the modern symphonic and sonata forms.

Schweitzer attributes Bach's eclipse in the latter half of the eighteenth century to the ahistoric rationalism of the Enlightenment. The Illuminati looked upon the art of the past as mere affectation and sought a musical ideal in emotional compositions of a "tender and pathetic expression" that were thought to be nearer "the truth than the music of the epoch of rigid rule."[2]

The post-Baroque period was not entirely devoid of Bach scholarship. In 1802 Johann Forkel enthusiastically published the first biography of Bach. Johann Rochlitz in the following decades wrote extensively on the aesthetics of Bach, admiring its truth, sincerity, and simplicity, all of which perfectly express an unparalleled depth and richness. It was not, however, until Felix Mendelssohn's performances of the St. Matthew Passion in 1829 that the resurrection of Bach began in earnest. Hegel, for one, in his *Aesthetics* or *Lectures on Fine Art*, which Mendelssohn attended, spoke in the most laudatory terms of Bach's art and put his imprimatur on the revival of the Baroque master.[3]

The nineteenth century was not universally enthusiastic about Bach's works. For example, Schopenhauer, who in his essay *On the Metaphysics of Music* declared that music unlike the other arts does not exhibit the Ideas or grades of the will's objectification but is a direct objectification of the will itself, does not consider Bach's existence at all.[4] During this period the relationship between music and words was variously debated. Schopenhauer's philosophy made music pre-eminent amongst the arts. He saw music as an independent art that does not require words and which can attain its ends from its own resources.[5] Richard Wagner, on the other hand, sought to marry text and melody, even though he often acknowledged Schopenhauer as his philosophical mentor. Nietzsche, in opposition to Wagner, exalted melody over word and came to denounce Wagner as a decadent Romantic and corruptor of music.[6]

Walter Pater attempted to sum up the essence of romantic aesthetics by taking music as the paradigmatic art wherein matter is most completely absorbed into form.[7] Thus, musical elements should be injected into the respective media of poet and painter. Eduard Hanslick, on the other hand, opposed a fusion of the arts and argued against the Wagnerian concept of uniting music and poetry. He understood music to speak nothing but sound and viewed "the undue prominence given to the action of music on our feelings" as the greatest obstacle to a scientific development of musical aesthetics.[8] These often colliding tributaries of discourse on musical aesthetics formed the background for a variety of interpretive approaches to the music of the past. The art of Bach was interpreted by the pure classicists almost as an arid mathematicism and by the romanticists as a model of descriptive musical feeling.

The bipolarity of reason and feeling and a harmonization of the two pervaded the aesthetics of music in the nineteenth century. Franz Liszt, for instance, looked upon Bach as the St. Thomas of music, having, in his works, achieved a great synthesis of faith and reason, of feeling and formal order. Schweitzer was sensitive to the many conflicting views of aesthetic interpretation in the nineteenth century, but it was undoubtedly the appearance of Philipp Spitta's *Life of Bach* in 1874 and 1880 that later brought home to him the realization that a book on the aesthetics of interpretation of Bach's music was badly needed.

Spitta's biography of Bach was so comprehensive and exhaustive that for more than a quarter century after its publication most students of the composer believed that nothing else could be added. By bringing the tools of classical philology and scientific historical investigation to bear on the study of Bach, Spitta established "a procedure for the finding and interpretation of musical material on the basis of documentary

evidence."[9] In the debate between absolute music and descriptive composition, between the purity of independent art and the fusion of text and sound, between Brahms and Wagner, Spitta jumped in on the side of the absolutists. He was afraid that Bach would be enlisted in the cult of the Wagnerians as an advocate of descriptive realism in music. He also believed that these comparisons would seriously distort the objective historical picture of Bach he was trying to draw. His aversion, however, to the romantic cults led in turn to the very interpretive distortions engaged in so tortuously by the Wagnerians. Spitta had to downplay or avoid altogether the many passages in Bach's music that are obviously and audaciously descriptive.[10] It was not until the publication of Schweitzer's book on Bach that the descriptive and pictorial in his music were fully integrated into the aesthetic interpretation of the composer while at the same time distinguishing him from the Wagnerian concept of music-drama.

The Origin of Schweitzer's Book on Bach

It was on a suggestion from Charles Marie Widor that Schweitzer originally undertook to write a book on Bach in French. Widor had complained to him that there existed in French only biographical books about the composer and none that provided an introduction to his art.[11] Many of Schweitzer's works were written with the practical goal of providing an interpretive guide for students. From the very beginning Schweitzer was primarily concerned with the correct method of rendering Bach's music, the biographical and historical usually being treated by him as introductory and subsidiary.

The Bach book appeared in 1905 and met with immediate success. It attracted attention not only in France but in Germany as well. Schweitzer was soon asked to do a German translation. He found it impossible, however, merely to translate the French text and started anew to write on Bach in German in 1906. The result was a revised edition of nearly twice the length of the original. It appeared in 1908 and an English translation was made by Ernest Newman in 1911.[12]

Schweitzer, though he relied on Spitta for historical and biographical material, stated quite explicitly what he saw as the primary limitation of Spitta's work - he subordinated the aesthetic viewpoint to the historical and thus failed to present the essential artistic quality of Bach's compositions as a whole.[13] Spitta's supposedly unprejudiced scientific historical investigations are looked upon by Schweitzer as narrow in scope for in them historical inquiry overshadowed musical aesthetics.[14] Schweitzer further criticized Spitta for mixing up biography with analyses of the compositions.

But it was against Spitta's position that pictorial representations in Bach were really "subconscious accidents" that Schweitzer took his most controversial stand.[15] Schweitzer believed that the descriptive elements were the essence of music and he goes into immense detail to show how Bach was a painter of pictures. Until the interpreter and performer had understood the pictorial purpose of the musical writing proper performance of the composition was impossible. It is only out of this milieu that one can understand the broader principles of Schweitzer's views on aesthetic interpretation and how he related those principles to his philosophy of life.

The General Principles of Aesthetic Interpretation

Schweitzer begins his Bach book with a distinction between subjective and objective art. Subjective art is sourced in the personality of the artist. It is almost independent of the epoch in which the artist lives, and is frequently in opposition to it. Subjective artists originate new forms for the expression of their ideas. An example of such an artist is Richard Wagner.[16] Objective art, on the other hand, is wholly of its time and works with the forms offered by the epoch. Schweitzer declares that the art of the objective artist is not impersonal, but superpersonal. In such art the artistic personality exists

independently of the human. In a quasi-Hegelian passage Schweitzer says that the objective artist feels only one impulse - to express again, in unique perfection, what he already finds in existence. It is the spirit of the time that lives in him.[17] Schweitzer prefers to compare Bach to Kant in this regard and using the language of the philosopher he calls Bach a historical postulate.[18]

There are both historical and transhistorical elements in Bach. He writes typical works of the time, in a singularly perfect presentation, and the history of his epoch objectivates itself in them as a culminating and transfiguring spirit. This is a good example of Schweitzer's deeper philosophical criticism of the historical disposition. The spirit of music, like the spirit of Christianity, cannot be elicited by history. In Bach there is a profound and abiding transcendentalism rooted in his religious experience. The aesthetic configurations associated with his artistic form and medium are the vehicles whereby he conveys to us this experience. Schweitzer is quick, however, to point out that any verbal expression of this is a "kind of speaking in parables."[19] History helps us clarify and understand these representations but it cannot divulge in itself the vital spirit that makes them possible. Schweitzer, then, is careful not to let word supplant tone, even though when it comes to the interpretation of musical sound the interpretation of the text is indispensable.

Spitta's analyses fail, in Schweitzer's view, at the very point where he should be looking for the innermost connection between the poetic thought and Bach's musical expression.[20] Schweitzer saw the basic problem of all music to lie in the nature of thematic invention. He maintains that "the impulse to express poetic and pictorial plastic thoughts is of the essence of music."[21] Schweitzer constantly returns in his aesthetics to the spirit that animates Bach's music, that allows this pictorial music to display itself as Gothic architecture transformed into sound and which yet remains so wonderfully plastic and full of natural life. A keen sense of mysticism is never very far from Schweitzer's analysis of any subject. Life itself has an ever present mysterious quality and great music is always redolent with a transporting mysticism, expressing in art such as Bach's the inexpressible.

Spitta's work shows us the limits of historical interpretations. In the nineteenth century Schweitzer equally saw a failure of aesthetical interpretation when it came to music. The aestheticians of music, unlike the aestheticians of other arts, do not start with the works of art. Rather, they limit themselves to the philosophical aspects in remoteness from the compositions, and, for example, give Schopenhauer, Lotze, and Helmholtz a larger place in their studies than Bach, Mozart, or Beethoven.[22] Schweitzer intends to put his aesthetics of music on firm ground and in a concrete relation with music itself by starting with tone-painting, symbolism, the descriptive and the programmatic.

Expression in music is wholly symbolical, according to Schweitzer.[23] He declares that "the translation of even the most general feelings and ideas into tone is a mystery."[24] Even pure music is symbolical for it too appeals to the hearer's power of imagination. Symbolism, for Schweitzer, is "the inner meaning that an external sign carries within itself."[25] All tones are symbolical and thus have significance, even though this significance does not have an indisputable definiteness or unambiguity. All the arts are symbolical and thus only different in degree not essence. Schweitzer is careful, however, to limit the ambiguity of the tone-picture to itself. He says that we must not conclude from this indefiniteness "a corresponding indefiniteness of the fancy that prompted it, and claim that music of this kind is absolute music."[26]

Schweitzer makes a distinction between poetic and pictorial music. The former deals with ideas and appeals more to feelings, while the latter is obviously concerned with pictures and appeals to our faculty of representation.[27] These two currents in music flow parallel to each other as well as often crossing each other. Schweitzer says that Beethoven and Wagner belong more to the poets, while Bach, Schubert, and Berlioz are more pictorial musicians. Bach is held up by him as the most consistent representative of pictorial

music and the direct antipodes of Wagner. On the basis of a theory of symbolism, wherein he follows the Wagnerian thesis that "symbol is identical with the form that signifies the content," Schweitzer can unify the interpretation of all compositions regardless of historical period.[28] Within this theory, however, one can have extreme differences in artistic form - Bach the pictorial musician, Wagner the poetical. Schweitzer's aesthetics are deeply rooted in romanticism yet he strains to keep his doctrine free from theoretical prejudices and systems - a procedure that he also consistently applies in theology and ethics.

The relation between word and tone in Bach is the most intimate that can be imagined, according to Schweitzer.[29] Bach's music "seems to confer a higher vital power on the words, divests them of their lowly associations, and shows them in their true form."[30] The composer had a unique ability to convert "into tone not only the body but the soul of the verbal passage."[31] For example, past masters of the chorale harmonized the melody whereas Bach harmonized the words. It is in the chorale-preludes and the cantatas that Schweitzer discerns the greatest influence in Bach of the poetry upon the music. In them the musical painting is more self-dependent.[32]

Bach has an active, not passive, relation to the text. He inspires the words more than they inspire him. He confines himself to expressing the basic mood of the words and takes into account only the most salient episodes. Bach conceives of nature through his imagination unlike Wagner who does so through his emotions.[33] Bach's nature-painting is always musical. The realism of his painting remains within the limits of musical symbolism. It is in the theme that the expression lies and this is what stimulates the conceptual imagination of the hearer.

Schweitzer states that the establishment of a musical language in Bach is not only crucial for the aesthetician but a necessity for the practical musician. It is therefore essential that a comparative study be made of all of Bach's works in order to conduct or perform any one of them properly. Bach's musical language must be understood for the interpretation of the purely instrumental works. Only through the comparison and interrelation of the vocal and instrumental works can the symbolic significance of the latter be deciphered. Schweitzer states that: "Many pieces in the *Well-tempered Clavichord*, in the violin sonatas, or in the Brandenburg concertos speak quite definitely to us, as it were, when the meaning of the themes is explained by the text that accompanies similar themes in the cantatas."[34] The forty-five chorales or chorale-preludes in the *Orgelbüchlein* are looked upon by Schweitzer as the dictionary of Bach's musical language and the key to the understanding of his music as a whole.

It is only in the detailed analysis of Bach's compositions that one can get a full appreciation of Schweitzer's pictorial aesthetics of music. He isolates different motifs for a wide variety of specific images.[35] There are "step" motifs which variously represent the idea of strength and confidence in tranquil and melodic lines, and lassitude and weakness in uncertain and wavering steps. There are motifs of beatific peace, of grief, and of joy. And there are "speaking" motifs in which the corresponding words are brought to mind, along with "expressive" chorales where the succession of words, phrases, or ideas is duplicated in the music. This rich panorama of imagistic interrelations between word and tone is explored by Schweitzer in infinite detail and has served as an invaluable guide for students and performers of Bach for most of this century.

In his autobiography Schweitzer summarizes the main tenets of Bach interpretation. First of all, the music must be presented "in living and perfected plasticity."[36] Secondly, Bach should not be performed with huge orchestras and massed choirs. In his music the orchestra does not merely accompany the choir but has equal rights with it. A choir of a hundred to a hundred and fifty voices cannot have an orchestral equivalent. Thirdly, the crescendi and decrescendi characteristic of the era of

Beethoven and after are only admissible within the alternations of forte and piano, otherwise they would ruin the architecture of the composition. Fourthly, a Bach fugue must never begin or end in piano because it invariably begins and ends with a main theme. Fifthly, Bach must not be played too fast. It is not the tempo but the phrasing which makes the lines of sound stand out. Correct phrasing is rendered through correct accenting. In Bach, the accents of the lines of sound do not generally coincide with the natural accents of the bars. Schweitzer points out that the tension between the two gives rise to "the extraordinary rhythmical vitality of Bach's music." Finally Schweitzer observes that these external requirements for playing Bach's music must be animated by our own inwardness in order to rouse the deep spirit that lies in it.

BACH'S MASS IN B MINOR

Bach's Mass in B minor illustrates *in toto* the many facets of Schweitzer's principles of aesthetic interpretation. On the surface it would appear to be the musical art-form least amenable to pictorial representation. The austere *Symbolum Nicaenum*, in particular, is put together in a thought-world totally removed from music. I will concentrate on the *Credo* to show how Schweitzer understood Bach to maximize to the fullest any images and dramatic ideas suggested by the text.

Schweitzer says the most salient quality of the B minor Mass is its wonderful sublimity. It is a Mass at once both Catholic and Protestant in which the objective quality of the chief choruses impart the grandeur and timelessness of the one Catholic and Apostolic Church. Alongside of the chief choruses there is a subjective and intimate spirit in the other movements which constitutes its Protestant element.[37] Spitta also remarks that in the B minor Mass there dwells the true spirit of the Reformation-epoch, "which showed Protestantism no longer as the antagonist and foe of Catholicism, but as an inevitable outcome and development from it."[38] The *Credo* has a self-contained architectural structure. There are three distinct sections which match each other in form and weight. The *Credo* and the *Patrem omnipotentem* relate to the Father with the former based on a Gregorian melody that is like "an over-arching portal, by which the precincts of the Church are thrown open to us."[39] Here Bach utilizes his studies of Pelestrina and the polyphonous church music of the sixteenth century. The second section relates to Christ and consists of the *Et in unum deum*, the *Et incarnatus est*, the *Crucifixus*, and the *Et resurrexit*. The latter three sections form a block and constitute the core of the *Credo*. The final part contains the *Et in spiritum sanctum* and the *Confiteor* and *Et expecto* which deal with the Holy Ghost. We have altogether two outer grand choruses at the beginning and end of the *Credo* written in five parts, then a Duet and bass Aria which surround the inner three choruses, the first two of which are written in an intimate style replete with the symbolism of the descent from Heaven and the Incarnation, and the last which celebrates the resurrection. The whole musical structure may be graphically represented:

Credo - Patrem	Choruses	FATHER
Et in unum deum	Duet	
Et incarnatus est	Chorus	
Crucifixus	Chorus	SON
Et resurrexit	Chorus	HOLY GHOST
Et in spiritum sanctum	Aria	
Confiteor - Et expecto	Choruses	

There is a wealth of thematic interrelation in all of the above sections. Throughout Bach remodels and shapes already existing works to the liturgical text. Schweitzer notes Bach's excellent Latin declamation in the *Credo* as well as how closely the theologian Bach represented in music the doctrinal formulae of the Greek metaphysicians. The bedrock of the Church and the perpetual unity of the Father is symbolized in the opening Gregorian theme and chorus. Out of it grow all the diverse elements of the movement. The *Andante* bass in the *Credo in unum*, which is replicated in the *Confiteor*, further emphasizes the unity of the Trinity.

The unity in diversity of Trinitarian doctrine is brilliantly represented in the *Et in unum Dominum*.[40] Both the soprano and the alto in the Duet are required to sing the same notes yet in a way that is different. The voices follow each other in strict canonic imitation just as Christ proceeds from the Godhead. Whenever the theme is given to the violins and oboes Bach makes the last two notes in the leading part staccato while in the second they are joined by a legato slur. Schweitzer states that this symbolism signifies the community of substance and the difference of persons and therein Bach shows that theological dogma "can be expressed much more clearly and satisfactorily in music than in verbal formulae."

The passage from the divine to the human in the first inner chorus is represented by a step motif of descending thirds that is prefigured in the Duet. The motif appears in the final bars in the bass and Schweitzer says this symbolizes "the Spirit being abased into flesh."[41] The *Crucifixus* is described by Schweitzer as soft and vaporous. It gives a transfigured sense and finality to the death of Christ. The *Et resurrexit*, on the other hand, "represents the victorious jubilation of redeemed mankind."[42]

Schweitzer, true to his emphasis on life and the will-to-live in his ethical thought, focuses on Bach's characterization of the word "vivificantem" in the Aria *Et in spiritum sanctum Dominum*. The fresh and flowing legato lines of sound in the oboes d'amore are a depiction of a Holy Spirit which makes alive corporeal existence.

In the *Confiteor* there is the same firm representation of the universal Church as one finds in the opening *Credo in unum*, but Bach was compelled to invent his own theme for polyphonic reasons. Nevertheless at bar 73 with the words "confiteor unum baptisma in remissionem peccatorum" he twice introduces the old Gregorian intonation in the bass and tenor and emphasizes the point by augmenting the imitation into whole notes. In the *Et expecto* three musical motifs can be identified, all of which represent the joyousness of the resurrection. Everything in the *Credo* presses towards a grandiose conclusion and a total summing up in exaltation of a completed religious experience.

The Relation Between Schweitzer's Aesthetics and His Philosophy of Life

In his theological studies Schweitzer found the historical view of liberal Protestantism to be insufficient. Similarly, in his ethical philosophy he focuses on the post-Enlightenment concern with history and the ethics of society as one of the primary reasons for the decline of civilization. Schweitzer's reaction to the predominance of history in his study of Bach is, in the words of one commentator, "the most courageous manifestation of pure aesthetics through a historical subject to be found in any work of musical criticism."[43] It is suggested by Schweitzer that all artists experience the same artistic impulse, artistic media being a purely external division.[44] Just as the cooperation of the arts in "the translation of aesthetic associations of ideas" should not be decided from the standpoint of one art alone, so also must the interrelation of aesthetics, religion, and ethics not be determined form any one of these in particular.[45]

In his doctoral dissertation on Kant there is a short analysis of the philosophical unity underlying the distinctive spheres of the aesthetic, religious, and moral genius. The moral genius, for instance, evaluates the complete horizon of

phenomena from the higher unity of a fundamental moral determination. Just as our own inwardness must animate the external requirements of performing Bach's music so must the discipline of aesthetic inquiry, in Schweitzer's view, be an integral part of the moral advancement of civilization. Reverence for life must pervade all levels of consciousness and being as a active ethical power. Without such a principle no meaning can be given to any interpretive aesthetics nor can music have a vital role in the maintenance and furtherance of culture.

NOTES

1. Manfred Bukofzer, *Music in the Baroque Era* (New York, Norton, 1947), p.260.

2. Albert Schweitzer, *J.S. Bach*, tr. Ernest Newman (New York, Dover, 1966), Vol I, p. 228.

3. G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, tr. T.M. Knox (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975), Vol, II, p. 950.

4. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, tr. E.F.J. Payne (New York, Dover, 1966), Vol. II, p. 448.

5. *Ibid*.

6. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Case of Wagner*, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York, Random House, 1967), p. 166.

7. Julius Portnoy, *The Philosopher and Music*, (New York, Humanities Press, 1954), p. 179.

8. Eduard Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music*, tr. Gustav Cohen (New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), pp. 89, 119.

9. Leo Schrade, "Schweitzer's Aesthetics - An Interpretation of Bach," in A.A. Roback, ed. *The Albert Schweitzer Jubilee Book* (Westport, Greenwood Press, 1970), p. 175.

10. An example of this is his treatment of the St. Matthew Passion. Spitta declares in one passage that "Bach commonly pays no regard to the scenic situation" and on another point, in reference to the string quartet accompaniment that floats around the utterances of Christ, he asserts that "The notion of *characterising* the omnipotent God by mere human means would certainly have seemed to Bach a blasphemy in itself." *Johann Sebastien Bach*, trs. Clara Bell and J.A. Fuller-Maitland (New York, Dover, 1951), Vol. II, pp. 546, 544.

11. Albert Schweitzer, *Out of My Life and Thought*, tr. C.T. Campion (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 60.

12. *Id*., p. 64.

13. Schweitzer, *J.S. Bach*, Vol. I, p. 255.

14. *Id*., p. 256.

15. James Brabazon, *Albert Schweitzer: A Biography*, (London, Gollancz, 1976), p. 165.

16. Schweitzer, *J.S. Bach*, Vol. I, p. 1.

17. *Ibid*.

18. *Id*., p. 2.

19. *Out of My Life and Thought*, p. 63.

20. *J.S. Bach*, Vol. II, p. 4.

21. *Out of My Life and Thought*, p. 66.

22. *J.S. Bach*, Vol. II, p. 7.

23. *Id*., p. 16.

24. *Id*., pp. 16-17.

25. Schrade, *op. cit*., p. 184.

26. *J.S. Bach*, Vol II, p. 18.

27. *Id*., p. 21.

28. Schrade, *op. cit*., p. 185.

29. *J.S. Bach*, Vol II, p. 25.

30. *Id*., p. 26.

31. *Id*., p. 30.

32. *Id*., p. 34.

33. *Id*., p. 43.

34. *Id*., p. 52.

35. *Id*., pp. 56-74.

36. *Out of My Life and Thought*, pp. 66-68.

37. *J.S. Bach*, Vol. II, p. 314.

38. Spitta, *Johann Sebastien Bach*, Vol. III, p. 44.

39. *Id*., p. 56. Even Spitta finds it difficult to avoid imagistic descriptions of the architecture of the *Credo*.

40. Schweitzer's analysis of the *Et in unum Dominum*, *J.S. Bach*, Vol. II, pp. 318-319 is not very different from Spitta's Vol. III, pp. 50-51.

41. *J.S. Bach*, Vol. II, p. 320.

42. *Ibid*.

43. Leo Schrade, *op. cit*., p. 194.

44. *J.S. Bach*, Vol. II, p. 8. See also, Brabazon, *op. cit*., p. 165.

45. *J.S. Bach*, Vol. II, p. 15.

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